John C. MenziesDay 7 Status and Update
The joint U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran began on February 28, 2026. It has now reached its seventh day as of March 7, 2026. Under Operation Epic Fury for the U.S. and Operation Roaring Lion for Israel, recent strikes have destroyed a strengthened IRGC logistics center in eastern Iran and cut off nearby monitoring networks. Israeli air units have kept control of the skies by shooting down four Iranian drones over the Arabian Sea.
Reports show a 94% overall drop in Iranian launches, with a 32% decrease in the last 24 hours. This highlights improved targeting. U.S. sea forces have strengthened defenses and taken out three more Iranian small boats in the Gulf of Oman, bringing the total sunk to 21.
Iran’s response under Operation True Promise IV has been mostly ineffective. It includes missiles aimed at coalition sites in Iraq. Hezbollah has stepped up shelling across the border, leading to Israeli counterattacks that destroyed munitions depots in central Lebanon and some advances into southern Hezbollah areas.
Casualties have risen as expected. Iran reports more than 1,400 deaths, including civilians in crowded districts. Lebanon has recorded around 80 deaths, with Israel reporting 16 casualties. U.S. military deaths total 10, while regional partners report an additional 18 deaths from related events.
The coalition’s work so far focuses on air strikes, with no confirmed ground involvement. U.S. officials highlight quick progress beyond expected timelines, centered on clear goals.
Recent Iranian Missile Attacks (Last 24 Hours)
In the past 24 hours (from March 6 to March 7, 2026), Iran has continued retaliatory missile and drone strikes on countries in the region including:
- Israel: Iran launched its 23rd wave of attacks, including a combined drone and missile barrage targeting Tel Aviv and central areas. Explosions were reported over Tel Aviv and Netanya. At least two missile barrages were detected, with many intercepted by Israeli defenses. Cumulative since the conflict began: 255 drones and missiles fired at Israel, with recent focus on urban centers.
- Gulf Countries: Strikes targeted several Arab Gulf states, with a heavy emphasis on the UAE which has imposed banking sanctions in response. Iran fired approximately 200 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones at Gulf nations in total, but in the last 24 hours, reports indicate around 50-70 missiles and drones aimed at UAE, Qatar, and others. Qatar faced its largest barrage, lasting about 90 minutes, with missiles intercepted near the U.S. Embassy in Doha. The UAE reported damage to a THAAD radar system in one attack. Overall interceptions: 181 of 196 ballistic missiles and 1,001 of 1,072 drones across the Gulf since February 28.
- Other Regional Targets: Iran struck the Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Region with missiles, targeting areas near Erbil. Azerbaijan reported drone attacks on civilian infrastructure, including Nakhchivan International Airport. U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria were hit by at least 20-30 missiles and drones, with partial interceptions.
These attacks aim to pressure U.S. allies but have been largely contained by regional defenses. Iran has warned that the Gulf is a “war zone,” threatening further escalation.
Western Powers’ Response
- United States: As Israel’s main partner, operations have increased after Congress approved the mandates. Officials suggest possible international talks after reducing Iran’s resources.
- United Kingdom: Limited to defense measures, including blocking attacks near key sites. The government condemns reprisals and pushes for restarting discussions.
- Japan: Not directly involved and has stressed the need for negotiation. Japan is concerned about impacts on its supply chain.
- Australia: No new developments and is focusing on bringing back its citizens.
European Powers’ Response
European countries, through the E3 group (United Kingdom, France, Germany), maintain a defensive stance. They condemn Iranian actions while advocating for a negotiated end to hostilities.
Arab Nations’ Response
Gulf states have limited their response to defensive preparedness and missile interception. UAE has imposed strict banking restrictions which will severely hamper Iranian exports when exports resume.
Kurdish Insurgency and Role of the CIA
Fighting along Iran’s northwestern border has increased. Air support has allowed small advances by Kurdish groups. Secretive CIA programs providing weapons and communications and satellite intelligence are helping opposition forces to divert Iranian resources.
Status of Shipping in the Gulf
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, has caused major disruptions to ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. As of March 7, 2026, vessel passages have almost stopped, worsening global supply chain problems.
Current Traffic and Congestion Status
Daily vessel passages through the Strait of Hormuz, usually around 120, have dropped sharply. Data shows a fall from about 98 transits on February 28 to just 18 on March 1, 7 on March 2, and one on March 3, with no oil carriers by March 6. Recent reports confirm tanker traffic fell by roughly 90% compared to the prior week, with only a few non-oil cargo ships trying to pass. Over 350 vessels, including oil tankers, LNG carriers, and container ships, are now anchored or waiting in crowded areas near the UAE, Oman, Iraq, and Fujairah. These ships are grouped as trapped inside the Persian Gulf (about 147 container vessels alone), waiting outside the strait, or having left earlier. This reflects voluntary avoidance due to higher risks, not a formal closure by Iran.
This over-crowding has created operational issues. Major ports like Jebel Ali in Dubai paused operations briefly due to air interceptions but have reopened with lower capacity. The Joint Maritime Information Center has rated the regional risk as critical, due to threats from missiles, drones, projectiles, and unmanned surface vessels during military actions.
Security Incidents and Threats
Rising attacks have made operators more cautious. Iranian forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have sent warnings over VHF radio, calling the strait a “war zone” and threatening to target any ships passing through.
Specific events include an unmanned explosive vessel attack on the Bahamian-flagged tanker Sonagle Namib off Kuwait, causing hull damage and an oil spill but no deaths. Projectiles have hit vessels including the Gold Oak, Libra Trader, and Saffine Prestige in the Gulf of Oman and near Fujairah. At least four tankers have been damaged, with two seafarers killed and fires reported on vessels including the Athe Nova and Stena Imperative. A container ship was hit by a projectile in the strait, expanding threats to non-energy cargoes.
Operational problems are worsened by widespread GPS spoofing and interference, affecting over 1,100 vessels since the conflict started. This requires using radar, visual navigation, and more bridge staff. VHF communication issues further raise navigation risks.
Insurance and Carrier Responses
The main obstacle to passing through is very high war risk insurance premiums. The Joint War Committee has widened high-risk areas to include the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and nearby waters. Reinsurers have set terms raising premiums from 0.15–0.25% to 1.5–4% of hull value, often needing extra reports and protections that make passages not worth it financially. Major carriers like Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and Ocean Network Express have stopped transits, halted new bookings, and added war risk fees while rerouting ships around the Cape of Good Hope. This has caused potential delays and cargo backups at European and Asian ports.
Freight rates have risen sharply. U.S.-to-Asia supertanker trips have hit record levels of about $29 million, equal to roughly $14.50 per barrel for a two-million-barrel cargo, or about 20–22% of current West Texas Intermediate prices. Container shipping faces similar issues, with 2–3% of global volumes affected and estimates of 1–10% effective capacity trapped, which could reduce availability from the Far East.
Broader Economic and Supply Chain Impacts
The disruptions go beyond immediate shipping issues. The strait handles about 20% of global oil supply and 20% of LNG, causing quick price changes. Brent crude has risen above $83 per barrel, with higher prices anticipated. Countries like Iraq and Kuwait may stop exports entirely, cutting up to 3.3 million barrels per day by March 15, putting more strain on global energy markets. Saudi Arabia has started sending oil through its East-West pipeline to Red Sea ports like Yanbu, tripling exports there in early March to reduce losses.
China is talking with Iran for safe passage of its oil and Qatari LNG ships, suggesting some exceptions during the blockade. The U.S. has promised naval escorts and insurance help, but it’s unclear if that will work as maritime insurance is complex and potential losses in the event of a catastrophic sinking are immense. Traffic is expected to stay low until either the security situation is resolved or the economic imperative to accept the risk becomes compelling.
Oil and Gas Price Impacts
The conflict has caused clear instability in global energy markets, with quick price increases due to supply disruptions and higher risks. International crude prices have reached about $82.70 per barrel, up 4.9% in recent trading. Local benchmarks have risen to roughly $79.50 per barrel. European gas prices have increased up to 42%, raising concerns about energy reliability there.
In the United States, average fuel costs have gone over $3.22 per gallon, an increase of roughly 22-29 cents from the conflict’s start. Forecasts predict more rises, possibly reaching $3.28 to $3.55 per gallon in coming periods if disruptions continue, along with broader financial pressures from ongoing high energy costs.
Longer conflict outlooks might push crude prices beyond $92 to $125 per barrel, driven by transit restrictions and attacks on local facilities, which make up around 20% of world oil supply.
Sulphur and Fertilizer Impacts
The restriction in transit through the Strait of Hormuz has caused sharp disturbances in global sulphur and nutrient markets, given the area’s key role in international exports. About 45% of traded sulphur, basic for nutrient production, passes this point, along with 32% of urea, 19% of ammonia, and 16% of phosphates. Main suppliers, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, face halted shipments, leading to quick shortages and strong price changes.
Sulphur prices have risen dramatically, with cases of quadrupling in some markets and a 9% surge in Asian markets due to limited Middle Eastern supplies. This directly affects the creation of nutrient formulas that need sulphur or sulfuric acid as main parts, such as monoammonium phosphate (MAP), diammonium phosphate (DAP), and ammonium sulfate.
With one-third of global supply at risk, this could place worsening cost pressures on farmers worldwide. The lack of large stockpiles increases vulnerabilities, potentially delaying plantings across hemispheres and rapidly raising food production costs. This may
Probabilistic Modelling
Likely Outcome of the Conflict
As of March 7, 2026, the effort shows strong containment, with quick gains in reducing Iranian abilities and solid regional support boosting resolution chances.
Most Probable Scenario
Containment and Ceasefire or Settlement 78-88%
More weakening of military and key infrastructure is expected to lead to continued containment, ending in a slow cessation of hostilities as the target package is diminished and a mediated agreement within one to two weeks. Talks, perhaps through regional mediators, might create revised disarmament agreements and weapon restrictions. It is unclear if the USA will agree to anything other than a significant change in Government.
Less Likely Scenario
Prolonged Stalemate with Intermittent Escalation – 8-12%
Remaining command structures could survive and the RIGC and the Basij may remain in place allowing the regime to continue to missile launches. It is also possible that Iran through proxies could expand the conflict beyond the immediate region and possibly into the neighboring Red Sea countries which have been an issue for shipping in the last few years.
Least Likely Scenario
Full Regime Collapse – 4-8%
Major upheaval remains unlikely without ground troops or internal defections which do seem somewhat unlikely.
Annexure: Estimation of Probability for Various Outcomes
The updated probabilities combine reviews from organizations like the Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, and International Institute for Strategic Studies, merged with current metrics from U.S. Central Command and conflict overseers. This uses subjective Bayesian reasoning, refining confidence levels based on new intelligence.
Starting assumptions, drawn from historical examples (e.g., 1991 Gulf efforts, 2011 area interventions), estimated 50% for limited/settled resolution, 30% for deadlock, and 20% for downfall, reflecting informed foundations amid few direct matches.
Intelligence merging has led to ongoing adjustments: Current developments, including over 2,700 targets hit, a 94% reduction in weapon launches, verified command removals, naval reductions to 21 units, and claims of accelerated progress, strongly support the containment idea. These measures, evaluated qualitatively, lead to upward changes of 12-18 percentage points for containment (from 66-70% to 78-88%), reflecting increased operational wins and containment skill.
Opposing factors, such as ongoing unconventional responses and related activities, offer small support for deadlock, leading to downward changes of 8-12 points (to 8-12%). Downfall probabilities remain low at 4-8%, shaped by observed strength without entries or local ruptures.
Variability shown: Stated ranges (e.g., 78-88% for containment) cover ongoing differences from interpretive assumptions, intelligence readings, possible misalignments, and unexpected events (e.g., electronic increases or coalition shifts). This update includes strengthened regional support from objections and alignments, further tilting beliefs toward quick settlement.
Likely Outcome in the Coming 24 Hours
As of March 7, 2026, forecasts for the next 24-hour period show continued operational pace, with chances for small gains in neutralizing assets and early diplomatic steps amid ongoing actions.
Most Probable Scenario
Sustained Aerial Operations with Incremental Degradation – 85-95%
Expected ongoing targeted airstrikes are likely to reduce more Iranian military structures, including command structure and missile stocks, within the next day. This path matches recent patterns. It is likely that discrete communications will continue with regional players as the Iranian regime attempts to limit damage, no significant outcome expected in the near term. Increasing degradation of Iranian capacity to attack neighboring countries and Israel and likely continued reduction in missile launches consistent with the dramatic reduction seen since the beginning of the war.
Less Likely Scenario
Limited Escalation via Asymmetric Responses – 5-10%
Iranian proxy forces may increase scattered retaliatory actions, such as drone entries or rocket barrages, causing temporary rises in regional tensions. However, coalition countermeasures are expected to contain such developments, preventing wider growth.
Least Likely Scenario
Abrupt Ceasefire or Major Disruption – <5%
An immediate stop or significant internal upheaval in Iran remains unlikely in the short term, given the lack of confirmed defections or external pressures sufficient to prompt rapid resolution. It seems that the Iranian population is staying of the streets. In the longer term the population will remain increasingly restive.
Annexure: Estimation of Probability for Various Outcomes in the Coming 24 Hours
The short-term probabilities combine insights from strategic reviews by entities including the Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, and International Institute for Strategic Studies, along with immediate indicators from U.S. Central Command and real-time conflict assessments. This applies subjective Bayesian updating to refine near-term expectations based on evolving evidence.
Baseline assumptions, informed by similar short-duration phases in historical operations (e.g., 1991 Gulf War daily progressions, 2011 Libya airstrike sequences), initially allocated 70% to controlled advancements, 20% to minor escalations, and 10% to abrupt shifts, reflecting typical daily volatility in aerial campaigns.
Recent evidence integration has driven refinements: Developments such as over 2,800 targets engaged to date, a 95% missile launch reduction, and verified neutralizations strongly bolster the degradation hypothesis, yielding upward adjustments of 15-25 percentage points (from 70% to 85-95%) for sustained operations, indicative of tactical continuity.
Offsetting elements, including persistent proxy activities, provide limited support for escalation, resulting in downward modifications of 10 points (to 5-10%). Probabilities for sudden disruptions are further reduced to below 5%, informed by observed regime stability and lack of imminent fracture signals.
Uncertainty intervals (e.g., 85-95% for sustained operations) account for variances in interpretive priors, rapid intelligence fluctuations, calibration uncertainties, and potential unforeseen factors (e.g., isolated cyber incidents or alliance adjustments). This projection incorporates strengthened coalition cohesion, tilting toward operational persistence in the immediate timeframe.