Analysis of the Iran War 2026

Day 5 Status and Update

The ongoing U.S./Israeli military campaign against Iran, initiated on 28 February 2026, is in its fifth day as of 5 March 2026. Coordinated airstrikes, designated Operation Epic Fury by the United States and Operation Roaring Lion by Israel, continue to target remnants of Iranian leadership, nuclear-related facilities, ballistic missile and drone infrastructure, air defense systems, naval assets, internal security institutions and command and control centers.

The operation has achieved substantial tactical progress, likely ahead of schedule given the apparent absence of mis-steps, including the confirmed elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the initial phase, along with at least 49 senior regime figures (including former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, the defense minister, chief of staff of the armed forces and IRGC commander). Additional leadership targets have been struck in subsequent waves.

U.S. and Israeli forces maintain absolute air superiority over western Iran, Tehran and other key areas. Over 2,000 targets have been struck to date, with the Israeli Air Force reporting the deployment of approximately 5,000 munitions. Recent developments include intensified strikes on Tehran (marking the tenth wave of attacks on the capital), a major assault on a military compound in Tehran and the downing of an Iranian Air Force YAK-130 fighter jet over Tehran by an Israeli F-35I.

A notable escalation occurred when a U.S. fast-attack submarine torpedoed and sank an Iranian warship (IRIS Dena corvette) in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Sri Lanka, described by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as the first such U.S. attack on an enemy naval vessel since World War II. U.S.

Figure U.S. submarine torpedoed and sank an Iranian warship (IRIS Dena corvette) in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Sri Lanka, described by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as the first such U.S. attack on an enemy naval vessel since World War II.

Central Command reports the destruction of 17 Iranian ships overall, severe degradation of Iran’s air defenses, ballistic missile launchers and drone capabilities (with an 86% reduction in regional ballistic missile firings since the campaign began, including a 23% drop in the past 24 hours).

The campaign remains primarily aerial, with no confirmed ground troop deployments by the U.S. or Israel. President Donald Trump has stated that operations are progressing “substantially ahead of schedule,” with Iran’s air force and navy described as “knocked out.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has emphasized that the U.S. is “accelerating, not decelerating,” with additional assets surging to the region and indications of strikes progressing “deeper” into Iran. Officials maintain that the operation is finite, focused on four core objectives:

• destroying ballistic missile capacity,
• annihilating naval forces,
• neutralizing proxy support and,
• preventing nuclear weapon acquisition.

Iran has continued retaliatory actions under Operation True Promise IV, launching missile and drone barrages against Israel (with interceptions and civilian impacts reported), U.S. bases and allied sites across the Gulf (including strikes on facilities in the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, where an Amazon data center and other targets were hit, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan) and Lebanon (prompting intensified Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Beirut and southern Lebanon). Disruptions persist in the Strait of Hormuz through attacks on commercial vessels and threats to oil exports.

Casualties have risen significantly: Iranian sources and international reports indicate over 1,000 deaths in Iran (including civilians, with strikes affecting hospitals, schools, homes and markets), approximately 50 in Lebanon, at least 11 in Israel, six U.S. service members and additional losses in Gulf states. The conflict has widened regionally, with airspace disruptions, transport issues and energy price spikes.

Western Powers’ Response

Western powers, including the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Australia, have generally aligned in support of the campaign’s objectives while varying in direct involvement.

• United States: As the lead belligerent in coordination with Israel, the U.S. has intensified operations amid domestic debate. The Senate rejected (53-47) a resolution to curb President Trump’s military actions under the War Powers Act, allowing continuation without further congressional approval for now. President Trump and officials have been asserting dominance while signaling potential diplomacy after capability degradation.
• United Kingdom: Participation remains limited to defensive intercepts (e.g., near Cyprus bases and supporting allies in Qatar). Prime Minister Keir Starmer has condemned Iranian retaliation and advocated resumed diplomacy, urging Iran to cease aggression, nuclear/missile programs and proxy activities.
• Japan: The government has refrained from outright endorsement of the U.S.-Israeli strikes, emphasizing dialogue to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue and urging Iran to halt destabilizing actions. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has called for diplomatic solutions and de-escalation, while prioritizing the safety of Japanese nationals and energy security amid concerns over Strait of Hormuz disruptions. Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi has engaged counterparts to support non-proliferation efforts.
• Australia: The government has expressed support for U.S. and Israeli actions to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to counter regional threats, while ruling out direct military participation or troop deployment. Prime Minister Albanese and Foreign Minister Wong have highlighted concerns over escalation, urged swift resolution through diplomacy where possible and facilitated evacuations and crisis support for Australians in the region.

European Powers’ Response

European powers, primarily through the E3 framework (United Kingdom, France, Germany), have adopted a defensive and diplomatic posture, condemning Iranian retaliatory strikes while distancing from offensive operations and pressing for resumed nuclear negotiations.

• France: France maintains a non-offensive role, with increased regional presence. President Emmanuel Macron has sought UN Security Council sessions to address escalation risks, endorsing calls for defensive countermeasures and dialogue.
• Germany: Germany avoids strikes but contends with Iranian attacks on bases hosting its forces in Iraq and Jordan. Chancellor Friedrich Merz aligns with E3 positions, condemning Iranian actions and signaling support for defensive responses while prioritizing de-escalation and nuclear negotiations.

European powers continue to focus on alliance protection, restraint and diplomatic resumption amid concerns over broader instability.

Arab Nations’ Response

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, have condemned Iranian retaliatory strikes on their territories as violations of sovereignty and aggression against civilians and infrastructure.

Targets have included military bases hosting U.S. assets, airports, ports, hotels, residential areas and oil facilities (e.g., Ras Tanura refinery in Saudi Arabia).

The GCC convened an emergency videoconference of foreign ministers, issuing a unified statement reserving the right to defend security and stability, including potential responses to aggression. Several states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have pledged full readiness to protect sovereignty and indicated coordination for defensive measures.

Qatar reportedly downed two Iranian fighter jets amid escalating threats. While condemning Iranian actions decisively, some states (e.g., Oman) have also expressed regret over the broader escalation stemming from U.S.-Israeli strikes and urged diplomatic containment to avert wider regional conflagration.

These nations, long hosting U.S. forces, face direct involvement despite initial opposition to offensive operations against Iran, heightening pressures for collective security responses.

Kurdish Insurgency and Role of the CIA

Reports indicate intensified activity along Iran’s very permeable western border with Iraq, where U.S. and Israeli airstrikes have targeted Iranian military outposts, police stations and security facilities in Kurdish-majority areas.

This appears preparatory for potential ground operations involving Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. The CIA has been engaged in a covert program, initiated months before the current conflict, to arm and support Iranian Kurdish militias based in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, with the objective of fomenting an uprising or creating a new front to stretch Iranian forces and facilitate popular protests or territorial gains in the northwest.

Discussions involve groups under the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (including the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan [PDKI], Kurdistan Free Life Party [PJAK], Kurdistan Freedom Party [PAK] and others), which have trained for cross-border actions and requested U.S. military support, including weapons and importantly air cover.

President Trump has reportedly spoken directly with Kurdish leaders, such as PDKI’s Mustafa Hijri. Israeli strikes in western Iran are described as degrading capabilities to enable such movements. Experts caution that this approach risks opening a “hornet’s nest,” potentially leading to chaotic civil war or broader ethnic fragmentation.

None of the Kurdish elements represent an expeditionary force and realistically has very limited capabilities.

Status of Shipping in the Gulf

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf has been severely disrupted as of 4-5 March 2026, effectively halting most commercial transits despite the waterway remaining technically open.

Major shipping companies, including Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd, CMA CGM and others, have suspended operations through the Strait, rerouting vessels (e.g., around the Cape of Good Hope for some routes) or directing them to safe anchorages. Pre-conflict daily transits of approximately 125 vessels have plummeted, with vessel tracking data showing a 70%or greater reduction since late February and many ships turning off Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals when attempting limited passages.

Approximately 750 ships are currently caught around the Strait of Hormuz, including around 100 container ships. This broader impact is contributing to cargo backups at transshipment hubs in Europe and Asia, with associated spikes in fuel costs and congestion concerns.

Around 200 tankers are stuck within the Persian Gulf, primarily smaller medium-range tankers (MR) for chemicals and refined petroleum, along with Panamax, Aframax and Suezmax types. Additionally, nearly 80 very large crude carriers (VLCCs, over 150,000 tons) are positioned on the wrong side of the Strait.

These disruptions affect oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and container shipping, with tanker transits largely halted since March 1, 2026, due to insurance cancellations and heightened risks. Qatar’s LNG output has ceased, prompting alternative supply sourcing and rationing in markets such as India. The disruptions stem from Iranian threats (including IRGC warnings prohibiting passage and threats to attack vessels), asymmetric risks (drones, unmanned surface vessels) and insurance cancellations. The Joint War Committee has expanded the high-risk zone (encompassing Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar), with war risk premiums surging from 0.15-0.25%to 1-3%of vessel value (higher for U.S., UK and Israeli-owned ships). Protection and indemnity (P&I) coverage has been withdrawn on short notice due to solvency regulations, rendering transits economically unviable.

President Trump has ordered the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide political risk insurance and guarantees at reasonable rates, alongside Navy escorts for tankers, though experts note limited U.S. naval assets to sustain escorts for high-volume traffic. While some limited transits occur with AIS off, overall trade, representing 20%of global crude oil and significant LNG, remains choked, driving oil price volatility, supply chain delays and potential global economic repercussions. Get the latest on global shipping from Sam Magliano

Likely Outcome of the Conflict

As of 5 March 2026, the campaign continues to be contained, with U.S.-Israeli efforts in degrading Iranian capabilities advancing more rapidly than initially projected.

Recalculations based on the latest developments, such as the accelerated pace of strikes, significant reductions in Iranian retaliatory launches and statements from U.S. leadership affirming progress ahead of schedule, suggest an increased probability of a swift resolution.

Most Probable Scenario
Containment and Ceasefire or Settlement 70-80%

The most probable scenario (70-80% likelihood) entails further erosion of Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure, culminating in containment and a de facto ceasefire or mediated settlement within the next two to four weeks. This could involve backchannel negotiations, potentially facilitated by Oman or Qatar, resulting in a revised nuclear agreement, constraints on missile programs, diminished proxy activities and partial sanctions relief. This would result in a “Venezuela scenario,” wherein a transitional Iranian leadership makes sufficient concessions to ensure regime continuity without complete collapse.

Less Likely Scenario
Prolonged Stalemate with Intermittent Escalation – 15-20%

A prolonged stalemate with intermittent escalation (15-20% likelihood) could materialize if remaining IRGC elements sustain operational cohesion through asymmetric tactics and internal repression.

Least Likely Scenario
Full Regime Collapse – 5-10%

Full regime collapse or major internal upheaval (5-10% likelihood) remains improbable without the introduction of ground forces or significant internal defections, given the entrenched nature of Iran’s security apparatus and its historical resilience to external pressures. Factors supporting containment include escalating casualties, economic strains from shipping disruptions, domestic political constraints in the U.S. and international calls for restraint. However, risks of miscalculation, such as intensified closures in the Strait of Hormuz or expansion of the Kurdish front, could alter this trajectory.

Annexure: Estimation of Probability for Various Outcomes

The probabilities assigned to the various outcomes in the Likely Outcome section represent a synthesis of analyses from institutions such as the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, alongside real-time military indicators from sources including U.S. Central Command reports and independent conflict monitoring entities. This estimation ultimately employs subjective Bayesian reasoning, a structured approach to probabilistic forecasting in which probabilities reflect degrees of belief rather than objective frequencies derived from large empirical datasets.

Key elements of the methodology include:

• Initial Priors: Established using historical patterns from comparable scenarios (e.g., U.S.-led air campaigns in Iraq 1998, Libya 2011, or targeted operations against non-state actors), along with pre-conflict expert simulations and institutional assessments. Baseline assignments approximate 50% for a limited/negotiated resolution, 30% for stalemate and 20% for regime collapse or major upheaval. These reflect informed belief rather than purely objective base rates, given the scarcity of directly analogous cases.
• Evidence Incorporation and Updating: Daily developments, such as over 2,000 targets struck, an 86% reduction in Iranian regional ballistic missile firings, leadership decapitation, naval attrition and official indications of operational acceleration, are qualitatively evaluated for their likelihood under each hypothesis. Positive indicators of U.S.-Israeli momentum (e.g., air superiority and finite-duration signaling) are assigned higher support for the contained outcome, leading to upward belief adjustments of approximately 10–20 percentage points. Persistent Iranian asymmetric responses and proxy activity introduce countervailing support for stalemate risks, resulting in modest downward adjustments of 5–10 points. Regime collapse probabilities remain discounted, informed by observed resilience in prior cases absent ground invasion or widespread internal fracture.
• Uncertainty Representation: The reported ranges (e.g., 60–70% for contained resolution) explicitly capture residual uncertainty arising from subjective elements in prior models, varying intelligence interpretations, potential miscalibration of likelihood assessments and the possibility of unforeseen developments (e.g., cyber operations, third-party escalation, or shifts in allied posture).